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This research seeks to examine road pricing on a network of autonomous
highway links. “Autonomous” refers to the links’ being competitive and
independent and having the objective of maximizing their own proﬁts
without regard for either social welfare or the proﬁts of other links. The
principal goal of this research is to understand the implications of the
adoption of road pricing and privatization on social welfare and the dis-
tribution of gains and losses. The speciﬁc pricing strategies of autonomous
links are evaluated ﬁrst under the condition of competition for simple
networks. An agent-based modeling system is then developed; it inte-
grates an equilibrated travel demand, route choice, and travel time model
with a repeated game of autonomous links setting prices to maximize
proﬁt. The levels of proﬁt, welfare consequences, and potential coopera-
tive arrangements undertaken by autonomous links are evaluated. By
studying how such an economic system may behave under various cir-
cumstances, the effectiveness of road pricing and road privatization as
public policy can be assessed.
Roadway congestion, air pollution from cars, and the lack of resources
to ﬁnance new surface transportation options challenge many nations.
Road pricing, the practice of charging users a monetary toll in addition
to the “cost” of time spent traveling, has been suggested as a solution
to these problems. Although tolls are common on certain expensive
facilities such as tunnels and bridges, they are less common on streets
and highways. However, a new generation of private toll roads are
being deployed, most recently SR-91 in southern California and the
Dulles Greenway in northern Virginia. There have been a few trials of
areawide pricing schemes, such as in Singapore and London, and many
other schemes have been proposed but not implemented. The combi-
nation of private and competing toll roads, ubiquitous over an area,
would represent a comprehensive market-oriented approach to urban
transportation problems, but its impacts are unclear. This research
seeks to examine road pricing on a network of autonomous highway
links with the goal of understanding the social welfare and equity
implications of widespread adoption of road pricing and privatization
under various circumstances. “Autonomous” refers to the links’ being
competitive and independent and having the objective of maximizing
their own proﬁts without regard for either social welfare or the proﬁts
of other links, though possibly being subject to regulatory constraints.
The basic approach taken is to begin with the link as the most ele-
mental unit of analysis and aggregate to more complex interactions,
including revenue and cost sharing.
A realistic network of highway links is not, in the economists’ ter-
minology, perfectly competitive. Because a link uniquely occupies
space, it attains some semblance of monopoly power. Although in
most cases users can switch to alternative links and routes, those alter-
natives will be more costly to the user in terms of travel time. Theory
suggests that excess proﬁts will attract new entrants into a market, but
the cost of building a new link is high, indicating barriers to entry not
easily overcome.
Although roads are generally treated as public goods, they are both
competitive when congested and excludable. These factors indicate
that it is feasible to consider them for privatization. Several advan-
tages are often associated with privatization: increasing the efficiency
of the transportation system through road pricing, providing incen-
tives for the facility operator to improve service through innovation
and entrepreneurship, and reducing the time and cost of building and
expanding infrastructure.
Most trials of road pricing suppose either tolls on a single facility,
or areawide control. Theoretical studies assume marginal cost pricing
on links and do not discuss ownership structure. However, in other
sectors of the economy, central control of pricing through either gov-
ernment ownership or regulation has proven to be less effective than
decentralized control for serving customer demands in rapidly chang-
ing environments. Single prices systemwide do not provide as much
information as link-speciﬁc prices. Links that are priced only at mar-
ginal cost, the optimal solution in a ﬁrst-best, perfectly competitive
environment, constrain proﬁt. Although excess proﬁt is not socially
optimal in the short term, over the longer term, it attracts capital and
entrepreneurs to that sector of the economy. New capitalists will both
invest more in existing technology to reﬁne its deployment and enter
the sector as competitors, trying to gain from a spatial monopoly
or oligopoly. Furthermore, new capitalists may also innovate and
thereby change the supply (and demand) curves in the industry.
By examining road pricing and privatization from a decentralized
point of view, the issues associated with a marketplace of roads can
be more fully explored, including short- and long-term distributional
consequences and overall social welfare. The main contribution of
this research will be to approach the problem from a theoretical and
conceptual level and through the conduct of simulation experiments.
Speciﬁcally, an agent-based simulation model is developed in this
study that incorporates travel demand estimation, road maintenance
and construction cost functions, pricing and ﬁnancing strategies of
autonomous links, and network performance evaluation. The sim-
ulation model considers both short-term traffic equilibrium and
long-term supply and demand equilibrium in a highway network;
it therefore more completely assesses the consequences of alternative
ownership structures and pricing strategies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1) have reviewed transportation privatiza-
tion at an empirical level, though the cases of roadway privatization
are few and not entirely successful. Even if roadways were privatized,
it is unlikely that their price structure would be left entirely to the
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D.C., 2005, pp. 147–155.private sector. In many ways, roadways are natural monopolies, in
that their provision and use has a declining average cost (aside from
congestion effects). The proposed model contains within it several
different forms of networks. Most obvious is the transportation net-
work as a physical system, which has been well developed in the
transportation literature (2). Boyce et al. (3) investigated the optimal
network problem from a global perspective and developed algorithms
based on optimal subset selection, which were later modiﬁed and
applied to medium-sized networks by Rothengatter (4). In the model
proposed in this paper, the links are autonomous and can interact with
each other. This provides a second level of network: an economic net-
work that considers coordination between ﬁrms (links). Johansson et
al. (5) describe various economic networks from an empirical view-
point, while Nagurney (6) provides a computational framework that
links analysis of economic networks (supplier–customer relation-
ships) with algorithms developed for the analysis of physical net-
works. Economides (7) compares the economic structure of networks
with vertically related industries. Because the model being described
here is inherently dynamic, it may not contain a neat equilibrium solu-
tion. A modeling approach using cellular automata suggests specify-
ing simple rules and allowing the system to evolve (8). The extent to
which links can set prices following those simple rules and still
achieve a maximum proﬁt level can be ascertained with the model.
Recently, Verhoef and Rouwendal explored interrelations between
pricing, capacity choice, and ﬁnancing in transportation networks
using a small network model (9).
Although the focus of this study is on the economic interactions
between links and the consequences of price strategies, the travel
demand and travel time components of the model need to be speci-
ﬁed (10–12). The monetary costs of infrastructure provision, user
operating costs, and social costs on highways as a function of ﬂow
have recently been estimated by several studies (13, 14), and these
costs will be considered by the links in proﬁt maximizing and the
prices they charge. They need to be integrated and solved in both traf-
ﬁc equilibrium (2) and long-term supply–demand equilibrium.
Zhang and Levinson developed an exploratory agent-based travel
demand model (15). However, in its present form, the model cannot
perform all functions of trip-based demand models.
AGENT-BASED NETWORK DYNAMICS MODEL
Few researchers have considered the process of transportation net-
work growth (or decline) at the microscopic level, although long-
term transportation network dynamics are important for assessing
alternative pricing policies and institutional structures. Analytical
models of network growth are not practical except under simple, ide-
alized conditions, represented by very small networks and analyzed
using the principles of transportation engineering, microeconomics,
game theory, and industrial organization. Zhang and Levinson pro-
posed a model of transportation network growth with average cost
pricing and myopic investment rules that demonstrates the feasibil-
ity of an agent-based simulation approach for transportation-related
policy analysis (16). Their simulation model is extended in several
ways in this study.
An overview of model components and their interconnectivity is
shown in Figure 1. A travel demand model predicts link-level ﬂows
based on network, socioeconomic, and demographic information.
Based on the demand forecasting results, links calculate revenues
and costs. An investment module then operates and causes annual
supply changes, producing an updated network. The transportation
148 Transportation Research Record 1932
network is represented as a directed graph that connects nodes with
directional arcs (links). The standard notation convention for directed
graphs is adopted for the following presentation on the details of
mathematical formulations of those submodels. The directed graph
is deﬁned as G = {N, A}, where N is a set of sequentially numbered
nodes and A is a set of sequentially numbered directed arcs.
Notation
Notation used is as follows:
Ar = accessibility of zone r,
CS0−i = change in consumers’ surplus from year 0 to i,
d(.) = cost impedance function in the gravity model d(ti
rs) =
Ds = number of trips destined for zone s,
DRi
a = disposable revenue of link a in year i (dollars),
Ei
a = revenue (earnings) of link a in year i (dollars),
Ki
a = cost of expanding link a in year i (dollars),
f i
a = average hourly ﬂow on link ain year i(vehicles per hour),
Fi
a = capacity of link a in year i (vehicles per hour),
G = Gini coefficient of accessibility inequity,
i = index of year,
j, k = parameters in the decentralized pricing model,
la = length of link a (constant) (km),
mr, ns= coefficients in the gravity model,
Mi
a = cost of maintaining link a in year i (dollar),
Or = number of trips produced from zone r,
qi
rs = demand from origin r to destination s in year i,
ti
a = generalized travel cost on link a in year i,
ti
rs = generalized travel cost from zone r to s,
vi
a = free-ﬂow speed of link a (km/h) in year i,
α1−3 = coefficients indicating (dis)economies of scale,
φ=scale parameter in expansion cost function,
γ=coefficient in the impedance function,
λ=value of travel time (dollar/h),
θ1−2 = coefficients of the BPR travel time function,
ρ1−3 = coefficients in the centralized pricing model,
σ1−3 = coefficients in the expansion cost model,
τi
a = link toll per vehicle (dollars; see Equation 4),
µ = scale parameter in maintenance cost function,
ω1−2 = coefficients in the capacity-speed model, and
ψ=coefficient to scale hourly ﬂow to annual ﬂow.
Travel Demand
A traditional four-step model is speciﬁed to estimate travel demand at
the link level, taking exogenous land use, socioeconomic variables,
and the existing network as inputs. Although the four-step model
serves well for demonstration purposes in this paper, future studies
should use more advanced travel demand models. For instance, com-
bined travel demand models address inconsistencies in the sequential
model by solving all steps in a coherent equilibrium (17). Activity-
based approaches (18) and agent-based microsimulation (15) improve
behavioral representation in travel demand models. A zone-based
regression structure is used for trip generation. The origin–destination
(O-D) cost table obtained from the previous year’s traffic assign-
ment is used for trip distribution in the current year based on a doubly
constrained gravity model (19, 20).
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i −γ The resulting O-D table is loaded onto the current year transporta-
tion network through the origin-based user equilibrium traffic assign-
ment algorithm (OBA) (21). The generalized link cost function
comprises two parts: a BPR travel time component and a vehicle toll.
The OBA algorithm derives link ﬂows at user equilibrium and
generates a new O-D cost table that will be used for trip distribution
in the next year. In the traffic assignment step, if the relative excess
travel cost is less than 0.001, the Wardrop user equilibrium (22) is
considered to be satisﬁed.
Revenue and Cost Functions
Revenue is collected individually by autonomous links in a form of
vehicle toll. The annual revenue is simply the product of the toll and
annual ﬂow. The amount of the toll depends on the pricing strategy
adopted by an autonomous link agent. Therefore, the following
revenue equation is proposed:
The link maintenance cost function has two determining factors in



































tain a link at its current level of service if the link is longer and carries
heavier ﬂow.
Link expansion cost is considered a function of link length, exist-
ing capacity, and additional capacity to be expanded. It is more




Two assumptions are made concerning the investment rules adopted
by autonomous links. First, it is assumed that the system is closed and
that all revenue will be spent to either maintain or expand links. Sec-
ond, there is no incentive for links to save revenue (i.e., revenue accu-
mulated in a year will be used in that year). These two assumptions
could be relaxed if a bank agent is included in the simulation model
and provides an endogenous interest rate. Disposable revenue is
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Trip Distribution
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attraction totals
UE Traffic Assignment








Network t Network t + 1
Pricing Model 
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free-flow speed 
flow k  = flow k–1 ?
Yes
No
k = k + 1 
Link toll k
Flow, toll, travel time, O-D cost
Maintenance cost 
Construction cost 
Measures of network effectiveness: VHT, VKT, CS, revenue, etc.
FIGURE 1 Flowchart of simulation model (UE   user equilibrium).Disposable revenue of a link is used to expand that link. There-
fore, one can substitute DRi
a for Ki
a in Equation 5 and solve for the
new capacity in year i + 1. It is possible that the disposable revenue
of a link is negative because of previous overinvestment or compe-
tition. In that case, the link will shrink in the next year because total
revenue falls short of maintenance cost. Note that this autonomous
investment rule is myopic because links care only about themselves,
ignore network effects, and spend all revenue immediately.
A capacity change is usually associated with a concurrent change
of free-ﬂow speed. Vehicles are able to travel at faster speeds on a
wider road with less impedance. Free-ﬂow speed and capacity data
used by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council in its regional trans-
portation planning model on more than 10,000 roadway sections
were used to study the correlation between speed and capacity. A
log-linear model is speciﬁed and estimated. R2 of the model is 0.7,
and both coefficients are statistically signiﬁcant at level 0.01.
With updated link capacity and free-ﬂow speed, some factors inﬂu-
encing travel behavior, such as link travel time and link toll, will
change. These supply shifts, combined with preference, economical
growth, and demographical changes, give rise to the emergence of a
new demand pattern.
Centralized Government Control
In contrast to decentralized investment decisions made by autonomous
links, revenues collected on all links may be pooled together, and a
central government agency may make all investment decisions. For
comparison purposes, a centralized investment rule is examined. It is
assumed that the central government can always adjust its pricing
policy (see next section) so that total network revenue is higher than
maintenance cost. The remaining network revenue is spent to expand
existing links based on beneﬁt–cost ratios.
The maximum possible beneﬁt–cost ratio (BCmax) of expanding
each link, as well as the corresponding optimal amount of expan-
sion, is computed based on Equation 5 and the following assump-
tions: (a) Traffic increases by 4% every year; (b) interest rate is 3%;
(c) value of time is $10/h for all users; (d) the planning horizon is
30 years; (e) only local travel time beneﬁts are considered. The net-
work revenue is used to expand the link with the highest BCmax.
Then, the link with the next-highest BCmaxis expanded until the cen-
tralized revenue is exhausted. Similarly, a capacity change results in
a new free-ﬂow speed according to Equation 7.
ROAD PRICING
Decentralized Autonomous Links
Autonomous links seek to maximize their short-run profits in a
competitive market. Because travel demand is elastic with respect
to price, the proﬁt-maximizing price is constrained by the market.
Competing links also restrict the price that an autonomous link can
charge and still maximize proﬁts. It is anticipated that each link will
have an objective function for proﬁt maximization. However, depend-
ing on assumptions of whether the firm perfectly knows market
demand and how the ﬁrm treats the actions of competitors, the Nash
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Whether this system converges upon an equilibrium solution and
whether that solution is unique are important questions that this
research addresses.
The incompleteness of information is profound in the market com-
prised of noncooperative competing autonomous links. The situation
of incomplete information is further aggravated by the fact that the
demand function on one link depends on its previous investment deci-
sions and the pricing–investment decisions made by its competing and
complementary links. How do autonomous links determine the proﬁt-
maximizing price in this dynamic situation? Underlying the decision
of each autonomous link is an objective function, proﬁt maximization
given certain amounts of information, and a behavioral rule that dic-
tates the amount and direction of price changes depending on certain
factors. Once a link has found a toll that it can neither raise nor lower
without losing proﬁt, it will be tempted to stick with it.
Therefore, it is assumed that links try to achieve proﬁt maximiza-
tion in this interdependent and evolving system by adjusting their
prices iteratively based on available information about link travel
demand. In each iteration, a link determines its price based on prices
and proﬁts in the previous kiterations. Speciﬁcally, a link ﬁts a qua-
dratic curve in the proﬁt–price domain. If the curve is concave, the
new price is identiﬁed at the maximum point. If the curve is convex,
the price corresponding to the maximum proﬁts in the previous k
iterations will be marked up or down by j percent to form the new
price (see Figure 2). This pricing rule helps the link maximize proﬁt
and keep the price changes small. A myopic pricing rule is plausible
when demand functions are unknown to autonomous links. The
assumption of unknown demand will be checked in the later simula-
tion experiment. If the demand functions turn out to be relatively sta-
ble from iteration to iteration (i.e., a reasonably accurate demand curve
can be estimated after several trials), the proposed pricing rule needs
to be revised because there are obviously better pricing strategies for
proﬁt-maximizing links.
However, a more intelligent link may realize that although it may
have found a local maximum, because of the nonlinearities that make
up a complex network, it may not be at a global maximum. Further-
more, other links may not be so ﬁrmly attached to their decision, and
a periodic probing of the market landscape by testing alternative
prices is in order. This too requires rules and should be explored in
future studies.
It should be noted that a homogenous user group is assumed in this
study. Several recent studies show that the ignorance of user hetero-
geneity and the possibility of product differentiation cause under-
estimation of the beneﬁts of road pricing and decentralized control
(23–25). The network growth model described above needs to use a
multiclass travel demand model to account for variation in value of
time, which should be pursued in future studies.
Centralized Government Control
Under centralized control, users pay a distance-based toll for using
the roads. This method is similar to a fuel tax except that the varia-
tion of fuel efficiency among vehicles is ignored. Free-ﬂow speed is
also included in the centralized pricing model because it also affects
fuel efficiency and hence the actual prices that users pay.
Note that even a link-based congestion pricing rule would im-
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SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
So far, a complete cycle of the network evolution process has been
modeled, and all elements in the ﬂowchart have been speciﬁed. This
demand-cost-pricing-investment cycle repeats itself year after year.
It is possible to simulate the growth of the network with alternative
pricing and investment policies. Measures of effectiveness collected
from these agent-based simulation experiments are valuable for pol-
icy evaluation. The issue of whether a transportation network evolves
better under centralized or decentralized control can be explored.
Estimation of Model Coefficients
Most coefficients in the speciﬁed network dynamics model are esti-
mated based on empirical data in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and
St. Paul, Minnesota). Estimation of the cost function (Equations 4
and 5) is documented in detail in Levinson and Karamalaputi (14).
Several power coefficients are determined based on the authors’ best
knowledge of economies or diseconomies of scale in transportation
network dynamics. A summary of estimation methods and results is
shown in Table 1.
Measures of Effectiveness
The network dynamics model provides the following information for
each year in the evolutionary process: population and activities at the
zone level; demand, travel time, and generalized travel cost at the
O-D level; and ﬂow, capacity, speed, travel time, and toll at the link
level. This information is used to develop several measures of effec-
tiveness (MOE) for the evaluation of network performance over time.
Total vehicle hours traveled (VHT) and total vehicle kilometers trav-
eled (VKT) are fairly standard network MOEs. The change in con-
sumers’ surplus between year 0 and year iis approximated by the rule
of half. Total net social beneﬁt is the sum of changes in consumers’
surplus and toll revenue.
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Accessibility to activities for residents in zone r is
That equity may be ignored is a concern in a privatized network
in which toll revenue is the primary ﬁnancing source. The Gini coef-
ﬁcient is used to measure the inequity of accessibility among differ-
ent network zones, which falls between 0 (perfectly equitable) and
1 (perfectly inequitable). If the results show degraded equity with
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FIGURE 2 Pricing rule for autonomous links: (a) concave and (b) convex.
TABLE 1 Coefficients in Simulation Experiments
Parameter Value Source
λ 10 Empirical ﬁnding
θ1, θ2 0.15, 4 BPR function
γ 0.1 Empirical ﬁnding
ρ1, ψ, φ 1 Scale parameters
ρ2 1 CRS of link length
ρ3 0.75 DRS of level of service
µ 20 Scale parameter
α1 1 CRS of link length
α2 1.25 DRS of capacity
σ1 0.5 Empirical ﬁnding
σ2 1.25 Based on empirical ﬁndings
σ3 1 CRS of additional capacity
ω1, ω2 −30.6, 9.8 Empirical estimates
k, j 5, 0.2 Link behavior assumption
BPR = Bureau of Public Roads; CRS = constant returns to scale; DRS =
decreasing returns to scale.The average and distributional properties of link price and capac-
ity will also be examined because they reveal the degree of network
hierarchy that may differ under different institutional structures.
Proﬁtability for autonomous links is also of higher interest for its
implications on viability of decentralized control.
Sample Network
The simulation system can be applied to any realistic roadway net-
work. The execution time is mainly determined by the convergence
speed of the traffic assignment model. A 10-by-10 grid network
(100 nodes and 360 links) is used herein to explore the consequences
of road pricing under alternative institutional structures. The same
initial condition is speciﬁed for both simulation scenarios: central-
ized government control and decentralized autonomous links. All
links in the grid network are 4 km in length and have an initial
capacity of 735 vehicles per hour (this value corresponds to a one-
lane road according to a regression analysis using the capacity and
number-of-lane data in the Twin Cities). The initial network is heav-
ily congested, with an average volume capacity ratio of 0.8 and an
average speed of about 10 km/h (because road pricing and privatiza-
tion are usually not considered for uncongested networks). The initial
land use is uniform among all 100 network zones, with 10,000 trips
originating from and destined for each zone, respectively. Conver-
gence of the simulation model can be measured directly by the num-
ber of expansion activities in the network. Under centralized control,
the network achieves the long-run supply–demand equilibrium if the
total revenue is equal to the total required maintenance cost. With
autonomous links, the equilibrium is achieved when the revenue is
equal to the maintenance cost on each link.
RESULTS
The long-term supply and demand in the grid network seem to equil-
ibrate under both centralized and decentralized control. All links
are expanded at the beginning of the evolutionary process because
of initial congestion. After about 70 iterations (or years), a stable
equilibrium is achieved under centralized control (see Figure 3). It
takes longer for the scenario with autonomous links to arrive at an
exact equilibrium, which is expected. Although there are still road
expansions after 100 iterations, those expansions are characterized
by extremely small changes in capacity. By examining the evolution
of link prices, we can better observe the equilibrating process with
autonomous links. When all links are privatized and start to make their
own pricing decisions at iteration 0, there is a fast increase in link
prices because of heavy congestion. After about 15 years of signif-
icant capacity expansion ﬁnanced by abundant toll revenue, links
must reduce their prices to maximize proﬁts. The average link price
continues to drop and eventually stabilizes itself around $2.5 after
more than 80 iterations. There are still instabilities in the network in
that any changes in individual pricing decisions may cause the system
to ﬂuctuate through ripple effects.
It is important to construct and understand link travel demand
curves, which determine the pricing strategies autonomous links are
likely to follow. The demand information at the link level is also valu-
able for the evaluation of alternative organizational structures for road
financing and pricing. The two graphs in Figure 4 are created by
aggregating ﬂows and generalized travel costs of all links in all sim-
ulation iterations. Under centralized control in which prices are
strictly determined by the length and the level of service of individual
links, a linear relationship exists between demand and price. There are
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several parallel straight lines in Figure 4a because links naturally
evolve into ﬁve categories based on their locations in the network.
However, with autonomous links making pricing decisions non-
cooperatively, the variation of demand at the same price level is so
enormous that it is almost impossible for a link to identify the theo-
retically best price. The myopic pricing rule is reasonable given these
results. With such a level of uncertainty and interdependency, links
may be forced to adopt practical pricing strategies based on available
information accumulated in their previous trials. Another implication
is that in a situation in which several private proﬁt-maximizing links
compete with many public roads managed by a centralized govern-
ment, it should be possible and rewarding for those autonomous links
to estimate demand with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
Another interesting question is whether a set of autonomous com-
peting links is a viable institutional structure for road ﬁnancing and
pricing. Can all links make and sustain a proﬁt? The answer is nega-
tive if links do not properly manage their revenue. The number of
links that can manage to generate a positive proﬁt continues to drop
over the years (see Figure 5). At the end of the simulation, only about
100 links still make money, whereas more than 200 others lose
money. This is because autonomous links overinvest early in the evo-
lutionary process when high prices bring in signiﬁcant revenue, and
they suffer high maintenance costs later on. This undesirable situation
can be avoided by using a price ceiling regulation or heavy regulation
on road expansions. Autonomous links should also be advised to use
toll revenue to invest other sectors with a potentially higher rate of
return. The overinvestment phenomenon under decentralized control
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FIGURE 3 Convergence properties.Zhang and Levinson 153
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FIGURE 5 Profitability of autonomous links.
trol (CC) and autonomous links and are summarized in Figure 7. Tra-
ditional network efficiency measures favor privatization. Average
network travel speed is consistently higher with autonomous links
over time (total VKT is comparable between the two scenarios,
whereas total VHT is lower with autonomous links). Accessibility is,
however, lower with autonomous links because faster speed is
achieved mainly by pricing some users off the roads or forcing them
to travel shorter distances. According to the computed changes in con-
sumers’ surplus, consumers actually gain more under CC than with
autonomous links. The changes in CS are negative because the base
case CS is calculated with the assumption of free-flow speed. On
the supply side, autonomous links collectively charge much more
to the users than does a central government agency, as shown by the
revenue comparison. Net social beneﬁt, deﬁned as the sum of toll rev-
enue and monetized changes in CS, is also smaller with autonomous
links than under CC. The reason that the pricing strategy of auton-
omous links is inferior to completely regulated pricing under CC is
manifold. First, the road market is not perfectly competitive. Spatial
monopoly exists and some links (e.g., those near the corners of the grid
network) are more dominant than others. Second, autonomous links do
not have reliable demand information because of intractable spatial
dependencies on competing and complementary links. In the simula-
tion experiment, this lack of information leads to myopic nonoptimal
pricing behavior. Third, autonomous links adopt myopic investment
behavior because of a lack of foresight that leads to overinvestment.
Finally, in the proposed model, links are not allowed to cooperate or
consolidate into more efficient structures. Revenue or cost sharing may
be beneﬁcial for individual links and the system as a whole.
Another observation is that the network is less equitable with
autonomous links. The Gini coefficient is significantly higher in a
privatized market. Therefore, the equity issue should be addressed
when road pricing with autonomous links is considered. Some kinds
of “basic access” criteria may improve equity but require government
intervention.
CONCLUSIONS
This research develops an agent-based simulation model to study the
problem of road pricing on a highway network composed of indepen-
dent, proﬁt-maximizing links. It addresses some issues around road
expand capacity until short-run profit is zero. Future studies may
develop more intelligent investment rules under decentralized control
by modeling learning behavior. An interesting note is that, histori-
cally, overinvestment in capacity or a speciﬁc transportation technol-
ogy is often related to decentralized control and competition (e.g., the
U.S. railroad industry in the 19th century). Figure 6 presents the equi-
librium tolls and capacity under both ownership structures. The exis-
tence of spatial monopoly is evident: the autonomous links at the
corners and on the edges face less competition and lower demand
elasticity, whereas links in the center must charge low tolls because
of the existence of many parallel competitors.
Hierarchy has been long observed in road networks. Most roads
have low capacity and carry low ﬂows, whereas only a few roads are
expanded to very high capacities and carry the bulk of traffic. Many
believe road hierarchy is designed intentionally by planners. The
results presented in Figure 6 clearly suggest that such structure also
emerges in a free market driven purely by proﬁt-maximizing behav-
ior. A hierarchical structure is usually more efficient but has serious
reliability and vulnerability problems. This infrastructure design issue
is addressed in Zhang and Levinson (26).
As stated previously, one of the most important tasks of this study
was to examine the welfare implications of road pricing with
autonomous links. Various measures of network effectiveness devel-
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FIGURE 7 Results: measures of effectiveness.
FIGURE 6 Equilibrium tolls and capacity: (a) centralized toll, (b) decentralized toll, 
(c) centralized capacity, and (d) decentralized capacity.
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(c) (d)pricing and privatization that have not previously been seriously con-
sidered, and it compares welfare and proﬁt consequences of alterna-
tive organizational structures. The proposed modeling system
integrates an equilibrated travel demand, route choice, and travel
time model with a repeated road pricing game between autonomous
links. Although a game theoretical approach seems to be more appeal-
ing, it is extremely difficult to model the payoff structure in a gen-
eral network. The agent-based system can serve as a test bed for
assessing long-term consequences of various transportation network
investment and pricing policies and institutional structures. Another
possible application of the system is to explore “free” roads that com-
pete with toll roads and the consequences of regulatory constraints.
Although this paper focuses on highway networks, the agent-based
simulation approach could be used to analyze other types of networks
with appropriate demand and cost functions.
The existence of spatial monopoly, spatial dependence, and demand
uncertainty may force independent links to adopt myopic nonoptimal
pricing and investment strategies, which in turn results in inferior
social welfare compared to centralized control. For the same reason,
many autonomous links eventually lose money in the pricing game.
Some degree of government intervention in the form of price ceilings
or restrictions on road expansion may prevent overinvestment. How-
ever, this is not to say that a market solution to highway ﬁnancing and
pricing is worthwhile. Besides noncooperative independent links,
there are alternative organizational structures that may improve both
private and social welfare.
One limitation of the research is that cooperation among auton-
omous links is assumed away. Just as airline networks seem to have
evolved a hub-and-spoke hierarchy, a speciﬁc geometry may be opti-
mal in a private highway network. There may be advantages to both
the private and social welfare if vertical integration of highly comple-
mentary links is allowed in the system. However, the degree of com-
plementarity for which integration serves both public and private
interests remains to be determined. As in other multiagent systems,
the critical issue here is the behavior of the decision makers: the
autonomous links. How do coalitions between links form? In what
circumstances will links pursue revenue and cost sharing? An interlink
negotiation process must be developed to answer these important
questions. The link pricing rule itself may be adjusted in the evolu-
tionary process through learning and adaptation. None of these efforts
is easy work. However, it would be interesting to see what kind of
organizational structure emerges to take advantage of economies of
scale in the network.
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